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INSURANCE LAW-SCOPE OF MCCARRAN-FERGUSON EXEMPTION
THE

"BUSINESS

OF

INSURANCE"-MEANING

OF

FOR

"BoYCOTT"-The

United States Supreme Court held that McCarran-Ferguson immunity did not attach for domestic insurance companies acting
with foreign insurance companies based on activity-based analysis
of the "business of insurance," but that such activity may have
amounted to a "boycott."
INTERNATIONAL LAW-EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE SHER-

ACT-The United States Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act regulates foreign conduct in the absence of a "true conflict" with foreign law.
MAN

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
In 1989, extensive antitrust allegations were leveled against four
large domestic insurance companies, several foreign re-insurers,
and two trade organizations ("Defendants").' More specifically,
nineteen states, several corporations, and a number of individual
plaintiffs (collectively "Plaintiffs"),2 filed complaints in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California,' essentially alleging that the Defendants violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act 4 in conspiring to force primary insurers to accept
1. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 468 (N.D. Cal. 1989). The Defendants included the Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford"), Allstate Insurance
Company, CIGNA Corporation, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, several foreign reinsurers, and two insurance trade organizations. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d
919, 922-23 (9th Cir. 1991).
2. The states were Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Ins. Antitrust Litig.,
723 F. Supp. at 491-92. The corporate and individual plaintiffs included the Big D Supply
Corp., Bay Harbor Park Homeowner's Association, Inc., Anastasios Markos, Environmental
Aviation Sciences, Inc., Carlisle Day Care Center, Inc., Discount Plywood Centers, Inc.,
Acme Corrugated Box Co., P&J Casting Corp., Henry L. Rosenfeld, Ace Check Cashing,
Inc., Glabman Paramount Furniture Mfg. Co., Inc., Durawood, Inc., Bensalem Township
Authority, Keyboard Communications, Inc., Carmella M. "Boots" Liberto, Les-Ray Bobcat,
Inc., and Jerry Grant Chemical Associates, Inc. Id.
3. Id. at 464.
4. See Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 470-71 (detailing the Plaintiffs' claims
more precisely). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
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changes to standard commercial general liability ("CGL") insurance policies.5 The numerous complaints were consolidated into
two representative actions.'
The activity precipitating the antitrust charges began in the late
1970s, when Defendant Insurance Services Office, Inc. ("ISO")7 began to revise its 1973 CGL forms.8 Four major liability-reducing
changes were considered: 1) replacing "occurrence" based triggers
with "claims-made" triggers,' 2) adding a "retroactive date" provision to the new "claims-made" trigger, 10 3) eliminating coverage
for "sudden and accidental" pollution," and 4) providing a "legal
12
defense cost cap.
In 1984, after having considered these proposed changes, ISO
submitted two alternative forms to state regulators; one retaining
the "occurrence" trigger and the other adopting the "claims-made"
trigger, but both lacking any of the other proposed changes.1 3 Dissatisfied with the degree of change in the final forms, the four major Defendants, Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford"),
Allstate Insurance Company, CIGNA Corporation, and Aetna Cascombination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
5. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2895 (1993). CGL policies
cover third party casualty claims against the insured. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2895 n.1.
6. Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 470. The complaints were grouped into two
categories depending on when they were filed. Id. The court chose the complaint from California to represent the "First Wave" of complaints. Id. at 470 n.5. The complaint from
Connecticut represented the "Second Wave." Id. at 470 n.6.
7. ISO is a group of approximately 1,400 domestic insurers that is the primary insurance support service provider for CGL insurance. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2896. ISO performed services including developing standard insurance policy forms, filing the forms with
state insurance regulation agencies, accumulating and interpreting actuarial statistics, and
distributing data pertaining to premiums paid, claims filed and paid, etc. Id. at 2896-97.
Defendants Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company, CIGNA Corporation, and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, were primary insurers and members of
ISO. Id. at 2896.
8. Id. at 2897.
9. Id. at 2896. This change would preclude coverage for claims arising after the policy period had ended even though the occurrence of the accident or exposure to the injurious condition took place during the policy period. Id.
10. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2896. This change would further limit liability by precluding coverage for claims actually arising during the policy period but resulting from accidents
or exposure to injurious conditions occurring before the policy became effective. Id.

11.

Id.

12. Id.
13. Id. at 2897.
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ualty and Surety Company, allegedly began taking steps to effectuate a conspiracy to force adoption of the proposed changes to the
forms. 4
Plaintiffs alleged that the four domestic insurance company Defendants took several steps to form a "boycott" in violation of the
Sherman Act.' 5 First, Plaintiffs alleged that Hartford enlisted defendant General Reinsurance Corporation ("General Re")' 6 to organize a boycott of the 1984 ISO forms unless the additionally desired changes were adopted.1 7 Secondly, Plaintiffs contended that
General Re sought support for the boycott from another named8
defendant, the Reinsurance Association of America ("RAA").'
Thirdly, Plaintiffs argued that all four domestic insurance company Defendants then convinced the London-based Defendants 9
to participate in the conspiracy as well. 20 Finally, Plaintiffs alleged
that these steps amounted to several different conspiracies among
the Defendants to withhold reinsurance unless the proposed additional changes were adopted.21
14. Id.
15. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2897-98. The use of the term "boycott" denotes a kind of
action prohibited by the Sherman Act and is used as a term of art in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See notes 42-47 and 101-19 accompanying text discussing the meaning of the term
in greater detail, and notes 23 and 24 for the text of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
16. General Re is the largest domestic reinsurer. Id. at 2898.
17. Id.
18. Id. RAA is the trade association for domestic reinsurance companies. Id.
19. The London-based Defendants were individuals and firms engaged in the reinsurance business at Lloyd's of London including, Peter N. Miller, Robin A.G. Jackson, Merrett
Syndicate, Three Quays, Janson Greene, Edward & Payne, Ballantyne McKean, Murray
Lawrence, D.P. Mann, C.J.W., Unionamerica, Terra Nova, Oxford, CNA Re, Continental
Re, and Kemper Re [hereinafter foreign Defendants]. Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at
471 nn.8-10.
20. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2898.
21. Id. at 2898-99. The Court looked at the following four different conspiracies similarly alleged in both the California and Connecticut complaints:
and the virtually
[1] The Fifth Claim for Relief of the California Complaint, ...
charge a conspiridentical Third Claim for Relief of the Connecticut Complaint, ..
acy among a group of London reinsurers and brokers to coerce primary insurers in
the United States to offer CGL coverage only on a claims-made basis . ..
and the nearly iden[2] The Sixth Claim for Relief of the California Complaint, ..
charge another contical Fourth Claim for Relief of the Connecticut Complaint, ..
spiracy among a somewhat different group of London reinsurers to withhold reinsurance for pollution coverage . . .
and the closely
[3] The Seventh Claim for Relief in the California Complaint ....
similar Sixth Claim for Relief in the Connecticut Complaint, . . charge a group of
domestic primary insurers, foreign reinsurers, and the ISO with conspiring to restrain
trade in the markets for "excess" and "umbrella" insurance by drafting model forms
and policy language for these types of insurance, . . .
[4] Finally, the Eighth Claim for Relief of the California Complaint . . . and its

960

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 32:957

Defendants moved for dismissal based on the contention that
Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.22 The district court granted the motion, holding that the
alleged conduct was "the business of insurance" and was sufficiently state-regulated that Defendants were afforded antitrust immunity under section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.2 3 Furthermore, the court found that Defendants' conduct as pleaded in
Plaintiffs' complaints did not raise any triable issues of fact as to
whether a "boycott," within the meaning of section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, had actually occurred.24 The court also dismissed the claims pertaining to the foreign Defendants, citing
principles of international comity.2 5
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower
counter-part in the Fifth Claim for Relief of the Connecticut complaint, . . charge a
group of London and domestic retrocessional reinsurers with conspiring to withhold
retrocessional reinsurance for North American seepage, pollution, and property contamination risks.
Id. (citations omitted).
22. Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 471. Defendants' motion was based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) which states:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: ... (6) failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
23. Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 474. Section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act provides:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance: Provided,That after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as
amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended,
known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal
Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance
to the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law.
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988).
24. Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 478. Section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act provides for an exception to the antitrust immunity it generally affords. It states that
"[n]othing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any
agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation." 15
U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1988).
25. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2900. Specifically, the district court examined the claims
against the foreign Defendants in light of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), afJ'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1032 (1985), pertaining to the doctrine of international comity. Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 484.
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court, 6 finding that all domestic Defendants forfeited antitrust immunity by acting in conjunction with the foreign insurers who were
not regulated by state law,2" notwithstanding the notion that the
conduct alleged may have amounted to a boycott.2 8 Contrary to the

district court, the court of appeals also found that international
comity did not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction.29
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.30 The Court certified three issues for review: 1) whether the domestic insurers lost
antitrust immunity by conspiring with foreign reinsurers," 2)
whether a boycott had occurred, 32 and 3) whether international
comity precluded exercising jurisdiction over the foreign
Defendants. 3
The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion." ' In
determining the loss of immunity issue, the Court focused on the
nature of the "business of insurance" as employed in the McCar26. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991).
27. Id. at 927-28.
28. Id. at 930.
29. Id. at 934.
30. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
31. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2900 n.8 (quoting from Pet. for Cert. at i, Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) (No. 91-1128)). Specifically, the Court framed
the issue as "[w]hether domestic insurance companies whose conduct otherwise would be
exempt from the federal antitrust laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act lose that exemption because they participate with foreign reinsurers in the business of insurance." Id.
32. Id. The Court stated the issue as "[w]hether agreements among primary insurers
and reinsurers on such matters as standardized advisory insurance policy forms and terms
of insurance coverage constitute a 'boycott' outside the exemption of the McCarran-Ferguson Act." Id.
33. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2900 n.9 (quoting from Pet. for Cert. at i, Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993)(No. 91-1128)). Specifically, the Court stated the
issue as "[d]id the court of appeals properly assess the extraterritorial reach of the U.S.
antitrust laws in light of this Court's teachings and contemporary understanding of international law when it held that a U.S. district court may apply U.S. law to the conduct of a
foreign insurance market regulated abroad?" Id.
34. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2911. The structure of the opinion was very elaborate.
Both Justice Souter and Justice Scalia wrote majority opinions. Justice Souter wrote for the
majority on the "business of insurance" issue and the international comity issue. See notes
35-41 and accompanying text pertaining to the "business of insurance," and notes 48-58 and
accompanying text pertaining to international comity.
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority on the "boycott" issue. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
Justice Souter also wrote a concurring opinion on the "boycott" issue. See notes 59-60 and
accompanying text.
Justice Scalia also wrote a dissenting opinion on the international comity issue. See notes
61-69 and accompanying text.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 32:957

ran-Ferguson Act.3 5 The Court first considered whether the action
taken by the domestic insurers in conjunction with the foreign Defendants was conduct encompassed within the "business of insurance," such that immunity attached.3 6 Writing for a unanimous
Court on this issue, Justice Souter pronounced that the court of
appeals had improperly used an entity-based analysis, as opposed
to activity-based analysis, to conclude that the foreign entities
were not afforded immunity because they were not subject to
state-regulation. 7 The Court found that the court of appeals took
the Supreme Court's language in Group Life & Health Insurance
Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 8 that "'an exempt entity forfeits antitrust
exemption by acting in concert with nonexempt parties,' 39 out of
context, to reason that the domestic Defendants had lost their immunity by acting with the nonexempt foreign Defendants.4" On
this issue, the Court unanimously agreed that the court of appeals
had erred in using an entity-based analysis, rather than an activity-based analysis. 4 '
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority on the issue of defining the
nature of "boycott" within the context of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. 42 The Court was required to determine whether a "boycott"
had formed such that immunity was revoked in accordance with
section 3(b) of the Act. 43 The majority placed great emphasis on
the idea that a necessary ingredient of a boycott was not just a
refusal to deal, per se, but a refusal to deal on other, unrelated
transactions; 44 transactions which Justice Scalia termed "artifi35. Id. at 2900-03.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2902. The court of appeals reasoned that McCarran-Ferguson immunity
was lost solely because the domestic Defendants acted with foreign entities. That is, the
court based its decision on the nature of the entities involved rather than on the character
of the activity and conduct alleged. See Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 928.
38. 440 U.S. 205 (1979). See notes 93-96 and accompanying text discussing Royal
Drug.
39. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2902 (quoting Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 231).

40. Id.
41. Id. at 2905.
42. Id. at 2911-17. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 2895. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text for
Justice Souter's concurrence.
-43. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2911. See note 24 for the text of this section of the Act.
44. Id. at 2913. Justice Scalia wrote of how the term "boycott" was used in the context of labor law in a strike where workers refused to deal unless their employer met their
contract demands. Id. He remarked that:
[N]o one would call this a boycott, because the conditions of the "refusal to deal"
relate directly to the terms of the refused transaction (the employment contract). A
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cial.'
Viewing the complaints in light of the motion to dismiss, 6
the Court then cited allegations within the complaints that created
triable issues to be litigated on remand, upon which the lower
court could find that a "boycott" had occurred.' 7
As to the third issue, regarding international comity concerns in
applying the Sherman Act extraterritorially, Justice Souter, again
writing for the majority, stated that international comity did not
necessitate dismissal of the claims against the foreign Defendants. 4 Citing Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.,"9 section 415 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, 50 and section 402 of the Foreign Trade Antirefusal to work changes from strike to boycott only when it seeks to obtain action
from the employer unrelated to the employment contract.
Id. (preceding discussion of In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), and the famous strike at the
Pullman Palace Car Company).
45. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2914.
46. Id. at 2917. The Court abided by the general rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove ,no set of facts which could possibly
support the claim. Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
47. Id. at 2916-17. For example, Justice Scalia remarked that if the primary insurers
writing insurance on the disfavored forms were refused reinsurance regarding other types of
risks on other forms, this could be a boycott. Id. at 2916. Or if the reinsurers refused to sell
insurance on all CGL risks, not just those appearing on the disfavored forms, this could also
amount to a boycott. Id.
48. Id. at 2908-11.
49. 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (following United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, L., J.)) See notes 131-35 for discussion of Aluminum Co. of
America [hereinafter Alcoa].
50. Section 415 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States provides:
(1) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made in the United
States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade that is carried out in
significant measure in the United States, are subject to the jurisdiction to prescribe of
the United States, regardless of the nationality or place of business of the parties to
the agreement or of the participants in conduct.
(2) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made outside of the
United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade that is carried
out predominantly outside of the United States, are subject to the jurisdiction to
prescribe of the United States, if a principal purpose of the conduct or agreement is
to interfere with the commerce of the United States, and the agreement or conduct
has some effect on that commerce.
(3) Other agreements or conduct in restraint of United States trade are subject to
the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States if such agreements or conduct have
substantial effect on the commerce of the United States and the exercise of the jurisdiction is not unreasonable.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415 (1986). The
Court also referred to Reporters' Note 3 which discusses the "effects doctrine" as posited in
Alcoa. See also notes 131-35 and accompanying text.

964
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trust Improvements Act of 1982, 51 the majority noted that it was
clear that the Sherman Act was intended to be applicable to the
activities of foreign entities which are intended to, or do in fact,
produce a substantial economic effect in the United States. 2 Thus,
the majority concluded that there was no doubt that the district
court could exercise jurisdiction.5 3 The Court also indicated that
because Congress had issued no opinion as to whether a court, in
applying the Sherman Act, should ever refuse to exercise jurisdiction because of international comity, the heart of the matter was
merely whether there was a true conflict between the United
States law and the English law. 54 Citing again to Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 55 the Court
concluded that because the foreign. Defendants did not argue that
they could not abide by both United States law and English law,56
there was no true conflict because the Defendants could abide by
the laws of both sovereigns.57 According to the majority, no other
considerations needed to be addressed in concluding that the principle of international comity would not bar prosecution of the foreign Defendants.5
Justice Souter also wrote an opinion concurring in the decision
that the complaints did sufficiently allege a "boycott" within the
51. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 provides:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce
(other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations,
or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this title,
other than this section.
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the operation of
paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only for
injury to export business in the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988).
52. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2909.
53. Id. The Court expressly stated that "[alt the outset, we note that the District
Court undoubtedly had jurisdiction of these Sherman Act claims .
Id.
54. Id. at 2910 (citing Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States
District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
55. Id. at 2910-11 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. e (1986) (discussing specifically subsection (3) and conflicting
exercises of jurisdiction)).
56. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2911.
57. Id. at 2910.
58. Id. at 2911.
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meaning of section 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to survive a
motion to dismiss, but differed with the majority as to how to
properly define a boycott. 9 In arguing for a more expansive view,
he opined that the majority had narrowed the scope of "boycott"
so far that the exception could effectively be lost in the future.60
Justice Scalia also issued a dissenting opinion regarding the majority's approach to the international comity issue."1 He conceded
that it was clear that the Sherman Act overcame the initial presumption against extraterritorial application,6 2 but he also considered the application of a second canon of statutory interpretation 3
in relation to the Sherman Act." The second canon, as applied
here, instructed that in passing laws, Congress was presumed to
have refrained from exceeding international law limits on prescriptive jurisdiction. 5 Justice Scalia explained that even though the
initial presumption against extraterritoriality had been overcome,
this second canon required the Court to consider whether the
Sherman Act conflicted with or violated notions of international
comity, even before exercising adjudicative jurisdiction. 6
He emphasized that United States jurisprudence had consistently recognized international law limits on the extraterritorial
59. In this portion of his opinion, Part II(B), Justice Souter was joined by Justices
White, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 2895 (Souter, J., dissenting). See notes 42-47 and
accompanying text for discussion of the majority's approach.
60. Id. at 2908.
61. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2917-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In this portion of his opinion, Part II, Justice Scalia was joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at
2911.
62. Id. at 2918.
63. Id. at 2919. This canon originally appeared as "an act of congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." Id.
(quoting Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, 143 (1804)).
64. Id. at 2919.
65. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. 2919 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of United States section 401(a) in referring to
"legislative jurisdiction" or "jurisdiction to prescribe." Id. at 2918. "Prescriptive jurisdiction" must be distinguished from what is commonly referred to generally as "jurisdiction"
or "jurisdiction to adjudicate."
"Prescriptive jurisdiction" is "jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e., [the authority of a state] to
make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of
persons in things whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or
regulation, or by determination of a court." RESTATENiENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401(a) (1986).
"Jurisdiction to adjudicate" refers to the authority of a state "to subject persons or things
to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in criminal proceedings, whether or not the state is a party to the proceedings." Id. See Hartford, 113 S.
Ct. at 2918 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2919.
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reach of United States statutory law. 7 In reaching his conclusion,
Justice Scalia applied section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States,6" coupled with the
presumption that Congress did not intend to exceed the limits of
its prescriptive jurisdiction, to conclude that the substantive scope
of the Sherman Act did not extend to the foreign Defendants in
this case."'
In order to better understand the rationale in Hartford, it is necessary to examine certain aspects of insurance law from an historical perspective, tracing the development of this broad area, focusing on antitrust regulation. Additionally, historical perspective on
extraterritorial application of United States law is proffered to illuminate the international comity issue presented in Hartford regarding the Sherman Act.
67. Id. at 2920.
68. Id. at 2920-22. Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States provides:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may
not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having
connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is
designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction
over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict, each
state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in
exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2); a state
should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(a) (1986).
69. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2920-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The business of insurance was not subject to federal regulation
to any extent until 1944.70 Before that time, the Supreme Court
held that the "business of insurance" was not interstate commerce,
and therefore not subject to federal regulation. 71 This proposition

was established in Paul v. Virginia,72 when the Supreme Court
first looked at the issue of whether Congress had the power to regulate the business of insurance.73 In Paul, the defendant had been
convicted in Virginia state court for violating a statute requiring
the local agents of foreign insurance companies to obtain a license.7 4 Before the United States Supreme Court, the defendant
argued that the Virginia statute he was convicted under violated
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 75 In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court found that insurance
policies were not interstate transactions, and therefore, the insurance business was not interstate commerce and not subject to federal regulation.76
70. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944). See
notes 79-86 and accompanying text for discussion of the case.
71. See, e.g., Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274 (1927) (upholding a Minnesota statute requiring foreign insurance companies to obtain a license to do business in
Minnesota); New York Life Ins. Co. V. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913) (upholding a
Montana tax on foreign insurance companies while finding that the great magnitude of
transactions and the use of interstate mail was not sufficient to make the business of insurance a burden on interstate commerce); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1894) (upholding a California Penal Code section making it a misdemeanor for one to obtain insurance for
a resident from a foreign insurance company that had not filed a bond with the California
insurance commissioner); Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886) (upholding a New York statute requiring a foreign insurance company to pay a tax rate equal
to the rate applied to New York insurance companies in that foreign state when that foreign
rate imposed on the New York companies was higher); Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
410 (1871) (upholding Illinois statutes for foreign insurance company licensing fees and taxing insurance companies on premiums collected).
72. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
73. Paul, 75 U.S. at 182-85. The state of Virginia required that foreign insurance
companies or their local agents wishing to do business in the state obtain a license to do so.
Id. at 168. To obtain the license, the insurance company was required to deposit a sum of
between $30,000 and $50,000 with the state treasurer. Id. The defendant was convicted in
the circuit court for the city of Petersburg under the criminal provisions of the statute for
acting as an agent of a foreign insurance company doing business without a license. Id. at
169. The supreme court of appeals affirmed and appeal was brought to the United States
Supreme Court on writ of error. Id.
74. Id. at 168-69.
75. Id. at 168. The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution appears in
Article I, giving Congress the power "[tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
76. Paul, 75 U.S. at 183. Justice Field wrote that:
Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce . . . . These [insurance] contracts are not articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the word . . ..
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The rationale of Paul v. Virginia was the controlling view held
by the Court through 1944. 77 It is widely believed that from 1868
to 1944, the Court was reluctant to hold that the business of insurance was interstate commerce because this would have resulted in
complete de-regulation of the insurance business." But finally, in
1944, the landmark case of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, ("SEUA"), 79 significantly changed the entire business of insurance and of course, insurance law. The issue
before the Court was whether insurance transactions were subject
to Sherman Act regulation."s The defendants in this case were alleged to have conspired to fix and maintain premium rates on fire
insurance policies issued throughout several southern states in violation of the Sherman Act.81 In a lengthy opinion considering the
historical development of Paul v. Virginia,8 2 the Supreme Court
found that the business of insurance transgressed state lines and
was interstate commerce subject to regulation according to the
83
Commerce Clause.
As a result of SEUA, the constitutionality of all state statutes
regulating the insurance business was called into question and a
They are, then, local transactions, and are governed by the local law. They do not
constitute a part of the commerce between the States ....
Id.
77. See note 71 for relevant cases.
78. See, e.g., Davis J. Howard, Uncle Sam Versus the Insurance Commissioners: A
Multi-level Approach To Defining the "Business of Insurance" Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 22 n.55 (1989).
79. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
80. The record actually presented two questions:
(1) Was the Sherman Act intended to prohibit conduct of fire insurance companies
which restrains or monopolizes the interstate fire insurance trade? (2) If so, do fire
insurance transactions which stretch across state lines constitute "Commerce among
the several States" so as to make them subject to regulation by Congress under the
Commerce Clause?
SEUA, 322 U.S. at 538-39.
81. Id. at 534-35. The South-Eastern Underwriters Association was comprised of almost 200 insurance companies and 27 individuals. Id. at 534. The states involved were Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id. at 535. In accordance with the long-standing holding of Paul v. Virginia, the district court sustained the
defendants' demurrer because the business of insurance was not interstate commerce, and
was therefore not subject to Congressional regulation. Id. at 536. See notes 72-77 and accompanying text for discussion of Paul.
82. See note 71 for relevant cases.
83. SEUA, 322 U.S. at 553. Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated that "[n]o
commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been
held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We
cannot make an exception of the business of insurance." Id.
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state of confusion reigned. 4 SEUA caused the states's fear of insurance de-regulation to be realized because Congress, unlike the
states, had passed no laws specifically regulating the business of
insurance.8 5 As a direct result of SEUA, the McCarran-Ferguson
Act ("Act") was promulgated to dispel the confusion and assuage
states' fears.8" Section 2(b) of the Act created an exemption from
Sherman Act regulation for the "business of insurance" to the extent that such conduct was regulated by state law. 7 This exemption was tempered by section 3(b) which eliminated the exemption
for purposes of the Sherman Act, where the conduct in question
amounts to "boycott, coercion, or intimidation."8 8 Thus, the Act
provided Sherman Act immunity for the "business of insurance" to
the extent that the conduct in question was state regulated and
did not amount to "boycott, coercion, or intimidation."
The purpose of the Act was largely to restore the state of the law
before the SEUA decision: that is, to preserve state authority to
tax and regulate the insurance -business, and to exempt the insurance business from antitrust prosecution to a certain extent. 9 But
84. See, e.g., Francis Achampong, The McCarran-FergusonAct and the Limited Insurance Antitrust Exemption: An Indefensible Aberration?, 15 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 141
(1991). Professor Achampong has written that "[ilnevitably, confusion and uncertainty followed the South-Eastern Underwriters Association decision as to the constitutionality of
state laws and the validity of state tax laws and regulatory provisions. Many insurance companies refused, and others threatened refusal to comply with state tax laws and other regulatory provisions." Id. at 144 (citations omitted).
85. See, e.g., Howard, cited at note 78. The SEUA decision was not welcomed by
anyone, including Congress. As one author has stated:
The concerns expressed by the dissenters in SEUA mirrored those of insurers, state
legislators, insurance commissioners, the NAIC and other insurance organizations, as
well as Congress itself, whose members did not relish the prospect of being responsible for regulating an industry that operated in forty-eight different states and a variety of territories.
Id. at 27.
86. See, e.g., Howard cited at note 78. It has been written that "[t]he combination of
these fears resulted in the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which was signed into
law nine months after the SEUA decision was announced and five months after the Supreme Court denied a widely supported motion for reconsideration." Id. at 27-28.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). See note 23 and accompanying text for brief discussion and
text of section 2(b). Justice Souter has stated that "[bly its terms, the antitrust exemption
of § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act applies to "the business of insurance" to the extent
that such business is regulated by state law." Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2901.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b). See note 24 and accompanying text for brief discussion and
text of section 3(b).
89. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1988). The policy declared in the Act states:
Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of
the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of
such business by the several States.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 32:957

the extent to which the exemption was to apply became a subject
for extensive litigation leading to Hartford.
Judicial interpretation was needed to precisely define the meaning of the "business of insurance," as comprehended within the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Supreme Court did not specifically
address this phrase until 1969, in SEC v. National Securities,
Inc.9 0 The issue was whether McCarran-Ferguson immunity attached to National Securities, Inc. in an action brought by the
SEC for alleged misrepresentations of fact made to insurance company shareholders while attempting to merge the insurance company with National Securities. 1 In reversing the court of appeals
decision that National Securities was immune, the Supreme Court
indicated that to decide whether a defendant has immunity for being within the "business of insurance," one must focus primarily
on the insurer/policyholder relationship. 2
Years later, the Court attempted to clarify the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson "business of insurance" in Group Life and
Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., Inc." The issue was
whether an agreement between insurance companies and certain
pharmacies was part of the "business of insurance" such that the
Id. See also Joseph E. Coughlin, Losing McCarranAct Protection Through "Boycott, Coercion, Or Intimidation," 54 ANTITRUST L. J. 1281 (1985). One author has stated:
Congress enacted the McCarran Act, to alleviate the concern of state governments
that their regulation and taxing of the insurance industry might be invalidated as an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce . . . . As part of this revitalization of
state insurance regulation, Congress limited application of the Sherman, Clayton, and
Federal Trade Commission Acts.
Id. at 1281.
90. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
91. National Securities, 393 U.S. at 455. After the trial court dismissed an amended
complaint essentially alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act, the court of appeals
affirmed the dismissal, attributing McCarran-Ferguson immunity to National Securities. Id.
at 455-56.
92. Id. at 460. The Court discussed what Congress' intent was in using the "business
of insurance" phrase, stating "whatever the exact scope of the statutory term, it is clear
where the focus was--it was on the relationship between the insurance company and the
policyholder." Id.
93. 440 U.S. 205 (1979). This case involved an agreement between the insurance company and certain pharmacies, which provided for the insurance company to reimburse the
pharmacies for distributing discounts to policyholders. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 209. Where
the insurance company was Blue Shield, the Court stated:
Under the Agreement, a participating pharmacy agrees to furnish prescription drugs
to Blue Shield's policyholders at $2 for each prescription, and Blue Shield agrees to
reimburse the pharmacy for the pharmacy's cost of acquiring the amount of the drug
prescribed. Thus, only pharmacies that can afford to distribute prescription drugs for
less than this $2 markup can profitably participate in the plan.
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McCarran-Ferguson immunity would attach.9 In concluding that
this particular insurer/pharmacy agreement was not part of the
"business of insurance," the Court indicated two important considerations: whether the agreement was made in order to underwrite
or spread the risk,9" and whether the agreement was essentially between the insured and the policyholder.9 6
Subsequently, the Court in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v.
Pireno,7 elaborated on the Royal Drug test. In Pireno, the issue
the Court advanced was whether an alleged conspiracy between a
life insurance company and the New York State Chiropractic Association was part of the "business of insurance" so as to be exempt
from Sherman Act prosecution. 8 In deciding that the alleged conduct was not part of the "business of insurance," the Court interpreted the Royal Drug test to include not only considerations of
whether the conduct was engaged in to spread risk, and whether
the conduct essentially concerned the insurer/policyholder relationship, but also whether the conduct was limited to the insurance industry.9 The caselaw development culminates in Hartford,
where the Supreme Court affirmed the use of the Royal Drug criteria while agreeing with the court of appeals that the alleged activ00
ity was within the meaning of the "business of insurance."'
Another area of extensive judicial interpretation is defining the
meaning of "boycott" as used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. One
of the earliest cases that examined the scope of "boycott" was the
1914 case of Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Association v.
94. Id. at 210.
95. Id. at 211-12.
96. Id. at 215-16.
97. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
98. Pireno, 458 U.S. at 122. In this case, a chiropractor sought an injunction, alleging
that Union Labor Life Ins. Co. violated the Sherman Act by conspiring with the New York
State Chiropractic Association to use a peer review committee in an effort to fix prices. Id.
at 124.
99. Id. at 129. The Court specifically stated:
Royal Drug identified three criteria relevant in determining whether a particular
practice is part of the "business of insurance" exempted from the antitrust laws by
§ 2(b): first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited
to entities within the insurance industry.
Id.
100. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2901-03. However, see notes 148-50 and accompanying
text for discussion of the court of appeals' error in reaching its decision on an entity-based
analysis rather than an activity-based analysis.
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United States.101 The issue in this case was whether an agreement
among several lumber retailers to boycott certain lumber wholesalers was a "boycott" such that it violated the Sherman Act.' The
Court indicated that the agreement rose to the level of an antitrust
violation because in seeking to increase profits for agreement participants, it sought to restrict competition.1 0
Likewise, in Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
FTC, 0 41 decided shortly before SEUA, 0 5 the Court affirmed a
cease and desist order to a group of designers who had violated the
Sherman Act by boycotting certain retailers because they sold
competing designers' garments.10 6 Once again, the Court noted that
the conduct and plan of the guilty designers rose to the level of a
violation because in striving to increase profits, it unfairly suppressed competition.107
The most significant decision on the "boycott" issue as it pertains to insurance law was St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
101. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
102. Lumber Dealers Ass'n, 234 U.S. at 601. The agreement was to boycott certain
lumber wholesalers who were selling retail as well. Id. at 605-06.
103. Id. at 614. The Court stated:
[Tihe present case shows that the trade of the listed wholesalers is hindered or impeded; that competition is suppressed and the natural flow of commerce interfered
with . . . . When the retailer goes beyond his personal right, and, conspiring and
combining with others of like purpose, seeks to obstruct the free course of interstate
trade and commerce and to unduly suppress competition . . . he exceeds his lawful
rights.
Id. (emphasis added).
104. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
105. SEUA focused more on the "business of insurance" issue, but the point of the
boycott-type activity in SEUA was also to increase profits and suppress competition. See
notes 79-86 and accompanying text. As Professor Priest has stated: "South-Eastern Underwriters Association, was of exactly the same nature as Fashion Originators' Guild...
[T]he boycott was designed to increase Association profits by reducing the extent of insurance competition." George L. Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of
Insurance, 63 TUL. L. REV. 999, 1018 (1989).
Post-SEUA decisions, such as Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary
& Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), continued along the same lines. The question in Northwest Stationers again centered on the issue of competition. The Court stated that "[tihe
question presented in this case is whether Northwest's decision to expel Pacific should fall
within this category of activity that is conclusively presumed to be anticompetitive." Northwest Stationers, 472 U.S. at 290. The issue once again was narrowed down to a question of
competitiveness.
106. Fashion Guild, 312 U.S. at 468.
107. Id. at 465. The Guild's plan, "[s]ubject[ed] all retailers and manufacturers who
decline[d] to comply with the Guild's program to an organized boycott [citing Lumber Dealers' Ass'n.] . . . and has both as its necessary tendency and as its purpose and effect the
" Id. (emphasis added).
direct suppression of competition ....
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0 8 This case
v. Barry."
revolved around the issue of determining the
scope of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption in relation to the
meaning of "boycott."' 0 9 This class action was brought by doctors
and their patients against four insurance companies alleging a conspiracy in which three of the companies refused to sell the plaintiffs malpractice insurance coverage, compelling them to accept the
terms of the fourth company.1 10 The district court dismissed the
case for McCarran-Ferguson immunity, but the court of appeals
reversed because the conduct alleged amounted to a "boycott,"
thereby removing the immunity.'
Accordingly, the Supreme
Court was required to determine whether the "boycott" exception
to McCarran-Ferguson immunity applied to relations between insurance companies and policyholders."' The Court specifically decided that "boycott-type" conduct was not limited to activity directed against competitors, but also included activity directed
against policyholders. ' 3 Once again the Court placed great emphasis on the fact that the conduct suppressed competition, especially
because of its detrimental effect on policyholders.''" This decision
made a great leap from limiting "boycott" to conduct directed
against competitors to conduct directed against policyholders,
thereby expanding the potential liability of insurers and significantly reducing the effective scope of antitrust immunity." 5
The scope of "boycott" was further refined by the Court's decision in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists."' The defendant

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

438 U.S. 531 (1978).
St. Paul, 438 U.S. at 534.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 534.
Id.
Id. at 552-554.
St. Paul, 438 U.S. at 553. In referring to the agreement the Court stated:

The agreement . . . erected a barrier between . . . customers and any alternative

source of the desired coverage, effectively foreclosing all possibility of competition
anywhere in the relevant market. This concerted refusal to deal went well beyond a
private agreement to fix rates and terms of coverage, as it denied policyholders the
benefits of competition in vital matters such as claims policy and quality of service.
Id. (emphasis added).
115. See Coughlin, cited at note 89, at 1281. Even in St. Paul, the notion that McCarran-Ferguson immunity had been limited was noted. St. Paul, 438 U.S. at 559 (Stewart, J.
dissenting). In fact, it has been recognized that the language of the section 3(b) exception
severely encroaches on the immunity. It has been asserted that "[tihis exception to the
McCarran Act exemption carries with it a recognized threat to render meaningless the basic
antitrust protection found in Section 2(b) of the McCarran Act." Coughlin, cited at note 89,
at 1281.
116. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
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organization adopted a policy of withholding patients' x-rays from
dental insurance claims agents, severely hindering the insurance
companies' ability to assess the monetary value of claims and, as a
result, allowing dentists to reduce competition, and potentially,
charge higher fees." 7 The Court refused to accept the dentists' argument that Indiana had a policy against review of x-rays and concluded that, even if it did, "[a]nticompetitive collusion" would not
be afforded antitrust immunity unless it was statutorily supervised. 118 Once again, the determination of "boycott" rested on a
policy to increase profits that unduly suppressed competition. 119
In order to grasp the significance of the international comity issue present in Hartford, 2 ' and specifically the disagreement between Justice Scalia and the majority,' 2 ' it is necessary to consider
the relevant historical development of extraterritorial application
of the Sherman Act. The application of domestic law in a foreign
territory has been traced as far back as the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, B.C. when Egypt granted the merchants of Tyre
rights to establish factories on the Nile.'2 2 But significant examination of extraterritorial application of American law did not occur
until the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries A.D.' 23
The first case to specifically examine the reach of United States
antitrust law was American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.'24 Justice Holmes used a strictly territorial approach in addressing the
issue of whether the Sherman Act could be applied to a monopoly
resulting from conduct taking place outside the borders of the
United States. 12 5 In considering the "comity of nations,"' 26 Justice
117. Indiana Fed'n, 476 U.S. at 449-51.
118. Id. at 465.
119. See Priest, cited at note 105. Referring to Indiana Fed'n, Professor Priest has
stated "[tihus, again, the prerequisite of an offense-increase in profits through artificial
interference in the market-was easily satisfied." Id. at 1023.
120. See note 33 for quoted text of the international comity issue.
121. See notes 61-69 and accompanying text for discussion of Justice Scalia's dissent.
122. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 58 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (examining historical development of extraterritorial rights).
123. See John P. O'Brien, Note, It Is Business as Usual in the ExtraterritorialWorld
of Title VII: American Employers Who Employ Americans Abroad Are Not Subject to
Title VII-EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991), 33 S.TEx. L.J. 313,
314 (1992). Before considering the extraterritorial application of antitrust law, in the early
Nineteenth Century, the Supreme Court had reviewed several cases involving crimes occurring at sea which did not actually require the Court to develop any principle of extraterritoriality. See, e.g., Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240 (1804); United States v.
Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 184 (1820).
124. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
125. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, as-
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Holmes recognized that all laws were presumed to be territorial in
application. 2 7 He posited that general words employed in the
Sherman Act, such as "Every contract," and "Every person," must
be strictly construed to apply only to those actually subject to the
legislation, and not just those who happen to be caught within the
immediate jurisdiction. 2 " In affirming dismissal of the action, 12 9
Justice Holmes concluded that because the allegedly unlawful conduct took place either in Panama or Costa Rica, it was not prohibited by the Sherman Act. 3 '
This territorialist view of legislative prescription reigned until
1945 when Judge Learned Hand delivered the opinion in the
landmark case of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
("Alcoa").
The question was again whether the Sherman Act
could be construed to apply to a conspiracy with foreign entities.132
After considering the 40,000 page record below, Judge Hand ruled
that the Sherman Act was applicable to agreements formed abroad
which were intended to, and did in fact, affect commerce in the
United States.1 33 Judge Hand's opinion in Alcoa has become
widely known for providing the "effects doctrine" test for extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act,13 1 while greatly expanding
serted that "the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done." Id.
(citing Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) (affirming the circuit court of
appeals' decision to reverse the district court and dismiss the action by finding that Mexican
law controlled because the accident in question occurred in Mexico)).
126. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356. It is important to recognize a distinction between "comity of nations" and "judicial comity" or the "comity of courts," as Justice Scalia
pointed out in his dissent in Hartford. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2920 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Comity of nations" is defined as: "The recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed.
1990). Whereas "judicial comity" is: "The principle in accordance with which courts of one
site or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a
matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect." Id.
127. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 359.
130. Id. at 357.
131. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The case was decided by this court by virtue of
Supreme Court certification to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 421.
132. Id. at 422.
133. Id. at 444.
134. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, "When In Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598 (1990). Professor Turley
writes:
Sometimes called the "intended effects" test (since the defendant must intend mar-
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the reach of prescriptive jurisdiction.' 3 5
Similarly to Alcoa and American Banana, Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Ass'n' 36
turned on whether the Sherman Act was applicable to foreign action. "3' 7 But in Timberlane the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted a three-pronged analysis for extraterritoriality which tempered the general holding of Alcoa. 3 The court disputed the notion that, since Alcoa, it was "settled law" that the Sherman Act
always applied extraterritorially, and recognized the importance of
considering "international law, comity, and good judgment" in deciding whether to apply the Sherman Act in a given situation. 139
The court indicated that the "effects doctrine" was lacking in necessary consideration of the effect of extraterritorial application
upon other nations. 40 In deciding for or against extraterritorial application in the modern era, the court illustrated three factors that
should be considered: 1) whether there was some intended or actual effect on United States commerce,' 2) whether the effect was
significant enough to warrant prosecution under the Sherman
Act, 4 2 and 3) the significance of the effect in terms of United
States interests against the interests of foreign states.' 43 The court
noted that the importance of this new three-pronged analysis, and
specifically the third prong, appears when determining the impact
on foreign relations of extending the reach of United States law in
private suits where the Executive Branch cannot weigh foreign reket effects), Hand's test became the standard for many market cases-both antitrust
and securities-and resulted in a sharp rise in extraterritorial actions. Courts gradually embraced the far-reaching "effects doctrine" that permitted liability under
American antitrust laws whenever an actual or presumed anticompetitive effect on
American markets could be shown.
Id. at 611 (footnote omitted).
135. See note 65 for the definition of "prescriptive jurisdiction."
136. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983),
aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
137. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 600-01.
138. Id. at 613.
139. Id. at 610.
140. Id. at 611-12.
141. Id. at 613.
142. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
143. Id. See also Russell J. Weintraub, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust
and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEX.
L. REV. 1799, 1810 (1992) (citation omitted), wherein Professor Weintraub summarizes these
factors as follows: "(1) whether there was 'some effect-actual or intended-on American
foreign commerce'; (2) the magnitude of the effect and the type of anticompetitive conduct;
and (3) a comparison of United States and foreign interests in a comity analysis." Id.
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lations consequences. 144
However, some contemporary courts have continued to adhere to
a purist approach in utilizing the "effects doctrine" derived from
Alcoa. For example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,1 45 declined
to consider the kind of "interest balancing" used in Timberlane.'4e
Instead, the court stated that it was "settled law" that domestic
legislation like the Sherman Act can regulate foreign action.4 7
In analyzing the precedential effect of Hartford, the two areas of
disagreement within the opinion are interesting. First, however, it
must be briefly noted how the court of appeals erred in its approach to finding that Defendants lost McCarran-Ferguson immu-

nity solely because their conduct with the foreign Defendants was
outside the scope of the "business of insurance."14' In Hartford,

the Supreme Court agreed that the domestic Defendants lost immunity. 14 The problem, though, was that the court of appeals misapplied the language of the Royal Drug three-pronged approach to
the task by taking a sentence out of the context of the Royal Drug
opinion to indicate that the three criteria amounted to an entitybased analysis rather than an activity-based analysis.'50 Hartford
144. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613. The court stated that awareness of foreign relations
implications "is especially required in private suits, like this one, for in these cases there is
no opportunity for the executive branch to weigh the foreign relations impact ...." Id.
145. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In a lengthy opinion, this case examined "a headon collision between the diametrically opposed antitrust policies of the United States and
United Kingdom, and is perhaps the most pronounced example in recent years of the
problems raised by the concurrent jurisdiction held by several states over transactions substantially affecting several states' interests." Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 916.
146. Id. at 948. In addressing interest balancing, the court stated that:
The suggestion has been made that this court should engage in some form of interest balancing, permitting only a "reasonable" assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction to
be implemented. [citation to section 403 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES omitted] However, this approach is unsuitable
when courts are forced to choose between a domestic law which is designed to protect
domestic interests, and a foreign law which is calculated to thwart the implementation of the domestic law in order to protect foreign interests allegedly threatened by
the objectives of the domestic law.
Id.
147. Id. at 922.
148. See note 37 for a brief summation of the court of appeals' reasoning.
149. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2901. The majority stated that "[wie therefore affirm the
Court of Appeals's judgement that it was error for the District Court to dismiss the complaints on grounds of McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity," but that "the Court of Appeals
did err about the effect of conspiring with foreign defendants .... " Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 2901. In Hartford, the Court stated that the "cases confirm that 'the business of insurance' should be read to single out one activity from others, not to distinguish
one entity from another." Id. (emphasis added).
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now affirms the use of the Royal Drug three-pronged test to analyze allegedly unlawful activity.15 1 Therefore, in the future, courts
must be careful to analyze allegedly unlawful conduct in terms of
the conduct itself, rather than making a categorical determination
based on the nature of the implicated parties.
Concerning the first area of disagreement in the opinion, it may
be that the majority has narrowed the definition of "boycott" so
far as to render McCarran-Ferguson immunity practically non-existent. 15 2 But this proposition had been addressed even before the
Court's decision in Hartford and the exemption has always been
1 53
construed narrowly.
The most consequential portion of the Hartford decision is the
split in the Court over the international comity issue.1 54 Interestingly, before Hartford, the Supreme Court had not specifically endorsed either the balancing approach of Timberlane1 55 and the Restatement, or the "purist" approach of Laker Airways.156 Writing
for the majority, Justice Souter leaned toward the "purist" or "absolutist" approach. In doing so, the majority correctly asserted
subject-matter jurisdiction, but failed to consider the consequences
to foreign relations by refusing to address the question of prescriptive jurisdiction.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia utilized a different approach which
does address international comity and foreign relations concerns.
The inquiry is not simply whether Congress intended to exercise
jurisdiction extraterritorially, and whether such an exercise would
directly conflict with the laws of a foreign nation. Rather, the analysis begins with consideration of Congressional intent, and proceeds to query whether Congress can exercise jurisdiction
extraterritorially.
The majority's misinterpretation on this issue stems from Jus151. Id.
152. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text for discussion of the majority's interpretation of "boycott," and notes 59-60 and accompanying text for Justice Souter's minority
approach noting the concern of eliminating the immunity altogether.
153. See, e.g., Joseph E. Coughlin, Losing McCarran Act Protection Through "Boycott, Coercion, Or Intimidation," 54 ANTITRUST L. J. 1281 (1986) (addressing the potential
loss of the exemption); Eric Peter Gillet, Comment, Exemption, Exemption, Who Has the
Antitrust Exemption, 17 PAc. L.J. 261 (1985) (addressing the constriction of the
exemption).
154. See notes 48-58 and accompanying text for discussion of Justice Souter's majority
approach, and notes 61-69 and accompanying text for discussion of Justice Scalia's
approach.
155. See notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
156. See notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
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tice Holmes' original articulation of the standard for extraterritorial application in American Banana,1' 57 nearly a century ago.
When Justice Holmes first examined extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act, he premised his analysis on a question of
whether Congress had intended extraterritorial antitrust regulation.1 58 His articulation was phrased so as to require clear congressional intent to override the strict rule against extraterritorial regulation; consideration for prescriptive jurisdiction was implied in
this phrasing. 5 9 Through the years, the strict rule was reduced to a
presumption against extraterritoriality. In relation to the Sherman
Act, this conversion culminated in Alcoa, 6 0° where the question of
intent was resolved: Congress intended to regulate monopoly conduct which did or was intended to have effect in the United States.
Today, it ' is rare that any substantial foreign economically-based
action is not intended to affect the U.S. economy. Foreign business
arrangements often contemplate exploiting the United States economic market. Today, there is no need to consider what was the
threshold question for Holmes.
Therefore, in following congressional intent and applying the
Sherman Act extraterritorially, the long-presumed and implied
prescriptive power must be considered. 161 The question is whether
Congress can regulate a particular foreign conduct. That is,
whether it is permissible and prudent for the United States to regulate the particular foreign conduct in question. Resolution of this
question must begin with a factual determination to establish the
extent and nature of the conduct in question, and subsequently
157. See notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
158. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 355-59. Justice Holmes wrote:
It is obvious that, however stated, the plaintiff's case depends on several rather
startling propositions. In the first place, the acts causing the damage were done, so
far as appears, outside the jurisdiction of the United States, and within that of other
states. It is surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the act of
Congress.
Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 355-59. As Professor Turley has stated:
The Supreme Court initially required clear expressions of congressional intent because all extraterritorial claims were viewed as running afoul of international law.
The change in the scope of prescriptive jurisdiction after American Banana was
brought about by judicial recognition that the world was no longer as Justice Holmes
understood it to be in 1909.
Turley, cited at note 134, at 655-56.
160. See notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
161. See note 168 for Professor Turley's comments on the out-dated need for considering congressional intent.
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proceed to a judicial determination of whether such conduct is of a
type that can and should be regulated. This second step requires
an examination of international interests and foreign consequences;"6 2 not merely whether, as Justice Souter states, a true
conflict of laws exists. 63
It would appear that the majority has inappropriately used sovereign compulsion defense"6 analysis to decide whether a conflict
of laws exists such that the Court would not exercise jurisdiction
over the foreign Defendants. But this type of analysis is used only
to decide whether that defense exists, not in deciding whether to
exercise jurisdiction and subject the defendants to United States
law in the first place. Where a court considers whether the defense
exists for a particular defendant, jurisdiction is necessarily already
obtained. This analysis for whether the sovereign compulsion defense exists is of a more highly refined nature used only when jurisdiction exists, not to determine whether jurisdiction exists in the
first place. 6 5 Clearly, Justice Souter has "put the cart before the
162. Former Secretary of State George Schultz has said that "[tihe question we face,
however, is not whether extraterritorial reach should be permissible but rather how and
when it should be done." 131 CONG. REC. S2197-03 (1985) (emphasis added) (statement of
Sen. DeConcini quoting Sec. of State's speech to the South Carolina Bar Association on
May 5, 1984).
163. While agreeing with the ultimate conclusion reached by Justice Souter, Professor
Weintraub also disagrees with Souter's approach. He has written that "Souter is wrong because he would apply United States law whenever there are any effects here with the only
possible exception being that in which a 'sovereign compulsion' defense were available."
Letter from Professor Weintraub to this author 1 (November 2, 1993) (on file with the author) (emphasis in original) (also disagreeing with Justice Scalia's approach). Thus, according to Justice Souter's line of reasoning, the requisite degree of conflict to prohibit the exercise of jurisdiction will never exist when the defendant has not been sovereignly compelled
to violate United States law. This reasoning can lead to undesirable results. See note 165.
164. The sovereign compulsion defense:
[Sihields from antitrust liability the acts of parties carried out in obedience to the
mandate of a foreign government. The sovereign compulsion defense is not principally concerned with the validity or legality of the foreign government's order, but
rather with whether it compelled the American business to violate American antitrust
law.
[But] [w]here the governmental action rises no higher than mere approval, the compulsion defense will not be recognized. It is necessary that foreign law must have
coerced the defendant into violating American antitrust law.
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1979) (emphasis
added).
165. The use of this analysis to determine whether jurisdiction exists leads to the inapposite conclusion that where a foreign defendant is compelled by foreign law to violate
United States law, jurisdiction exists. But his defense-sovereign compulsion-has already
been proven in the jurisdictional analysis, potentially causing a moot case.
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horse," in this instance. "I
The international interest balancing required in this type of case
is illustrated in Timberlane.6 7 Appropriately, in that case the
Ninth Circuit made no inquiry into congressional intent. 166 Alcoa
and the subsequently codified Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act"6 9 are dispositive of this threshold issue. As there is no
doubt about congressional intent, the following inquiry is to establish to what extent congressional intent can be carried out. That is,
whether Congress can be permitted to apply its regulatory schemes
to persons and conduct beyond U.S. borders. This is a question of
prescriptive jurisdiction.
The reasons for such an approach are manifest in the modern
global economy. Where the Executive branch has no opportunity
to consider the foreign relations consequences of a particular extension of U.S. regulatory law, the responsibility falls to the judiciary. The courts must consider the foreign relations impact and
consequences of applying an American law passed in 1890 to foreign conduct taking place in 1990. In doing so, the judiciary acts to
check and balance Congressional intent. In Hartford, the majority's limited "true conflict" approach neglects to adequately address this necessary responsibility; whereas, in his dissent, Justice
166. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2910 n.25.
167. See notes 136-44 and accompanying text. In discussing the balancing process used
in Timberlane, the court in Mannington Mills, stated:
The factors we believe should be considered include: 1. Degree of conflict with foreign
law or policy; 2. Nationality of the parties; 3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that abroad; 4. Availability of a remedy abroad and
the pendency of litigation there; 5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American
commerce and its foreseeability; 6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court
exercises jurisdiction and grants relief; 7.If relief is granted, whether a party will be
placed in the position of being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be
under conflicting requirements by both countries; 8. Whether the court can make its
order effective; 9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if
made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances; 10. Whether a treaty with
the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98 (footnote omitted).
168. Professor Turley has indicated that:
After American Banana, however, courts expanded the potential scope of prescriptive jurisdiction to encompass behaviour within the effects or conduct tests.
With the liberalization of prescriptive jurisdiction courts today rarely even mention,
let alone apply, the clear congressional intent standard in market cases. The courts
find ample grounds for jurisdiction under the prescriptive principle, making the question of extraterritorial intent less significant.
Turley, cited at note 134, at 636-37.
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 6a, 45(a)(3) (1988).
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Scalia shoulders it with the appropriate aid of the Restatement.
The Restatement supplies factors which serve to justify extraterritorial regulation in a given situation. 170 Blind adherence to these
factors is not required, but a level of deference to them substantiates extraterritorial regulation and provides a basis for international recognition of United States sovereign capacity to defend
against domestic economic injury. In conclusion, it is not argued
here that the judicial branch must defer to international concerns
in all cases, but that judicial recognition of those concerns in
United States courts provides a more substantial basis for foreign
states to defer to the international reach of United States law.
Kevin J. McKeon

170. See note 68 for the text of section 403 of the Restatement. See also note 167 for
factors used by circuit courts in Timberlane and Mannington Mills.

